Как лондонские конвенции 1840 1841 гг изменили режим черноморских проливов

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In the London Straits Convention concluded on 13 July 1841 between the Great Powers of Europe at the time—Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Austria and Prussia—the «ancient rule» of the Ottoman Empire was re-established by closing the Turkish Straits (the Bosporus and Dardanelles), which link the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, from all warships whatsoever, barring those of the Sultan’s allies during wartime. It thus benefited British naval power at the expense of Russia as the latter lacked direct access for its navy to the Mediterranean.^[1]

The treaty is one in a series dealing with access to the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles. It evolved as a reaction to the secret article in the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi (Unkiar Skelessi), created in 1833, in which the Ottoman Empire guaranteed exclusive use of the straits to Ottoman and Imperial Russian warships in the case of a general war, allowing no «foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever».^[2] The modern treaty controlling relations is the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits from 1936, which is still in force.

Historical background[edit]

The Straits Convention was an agreement between the major powers to strengthen the Ottoman Empire.^[3] It evolved from the earlier Treaty of the Dardanelles, signed between Britain and the Ottomans in 1809.

Beginning in 1831, Egypt, under the leadership of Muhammad Ali of Egypt, was revolting against the Ottoman Empire, resulting in the Egyptian–Ottoman War (1831–33). Russian Tsar, Nicholas I, chose to support the Ottomans. In 1833, Russia sent a naval force and troops to support the Ottoman defence of Constantinople. Britain was likewise supporting the Ottoman Empire.^[3]

Nevertheless, Russia was then the Ottomans’ principal ally; the two countries signed the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, which reflected this alliance. The Treaty guaranteed that the Ottomans would close the Straits to foreign warships if and when Russia was under threat, and requested this.^[3]

Negotiations[edit]

Still, the hostility between the Turks and the Egyptians continued in 1839, resulting in the Egyptian–Ottoman War (1839–41). The Egyptians again threatened the Ottoman positions. Lord Palmerston of Britain called for talks with Russia, Austria, and Prussia in London in 1840.^[3] This resulted in the Convention of London (1840).

Efforts were made to convince France, which tended to side with Mehmet, to accept a multilateral agreement. This evolved into the Straits Convention of 1841, which included guarantees similar to those of the 1809 Treaty of the Dardanelles, also extending the 1840 Convention of London.

The motivation of Tsar Nicholas I to agree to the closing of the straits has been said to be his uneasiness over the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi,^{[citation needed]} which he feared might turn the other Great Powers against Russia by creating too close an alliance between him and the Sultan, Abdülmecid I.^{[citation needed]} He also authorised the British Navy to quell the attack on the Ottoman Empire by its former vassal, Muhammad Ali. However, Anglo-Russian tensions over the region remained, leading eventually to the Crimean War.

Outcomes[edit]

From the British point of view, this convention helped preserve the European balance of power by preventing Russia’s newly powerful navy from dominating the Mediterranean^{[citation needed]}. From the Russian point of view, the treaty encouraged the aggressive policies of Britain in the region, which would lead to the Crimean War.^{[citation needed]} Different interpretations, as well as history of British-Russian relations in the 1840s, suggest that the Straits Convention ‘appeared to establish a new era of harmony’ between both powers, keeping Russian navy out of the Mediterranean and British out of the Black Sea.^[4]

While these arrangements forced Tsar Nicholas I to abandon his plans for reducing the Ottoman Empire to complete dependence upon Russia and wresting the control of the Christian countries of the Balkans from the Porte, the Ottoman Empire was not wholly independent after the convention, as it relied on Britain and France for protection.^{[citation needed]}

See also[edit]

• International waterway

References[edit]

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In the London Straits Convention concluded on 13 July 1841 between the Great Powers of Europe at the time—Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Austria and Prussia—the «ancient rule» of the Ottoman Empire was re-established by closing the Turkish Straits (the Bosporus and Dardanelles), which link the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, from all warships whatsoever, barring those of the Sultan’s allies during wartime. It thus benefited British naval power at the expense of Russia as the latter lacked direct access for its navy to the Mediterranean.^[1]

The treaty is one in a series dealing with access to the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles. It evolved as a reaction to the secret article in the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi (Unkiar Skelessi), created in 1833, in which the Ottoman Empire guaranteed exclusive use of the straits to Ottoman and Imperial Russian warships in the case of a general war, allowing no «foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever».^[2] The modern treaty controlling relations is the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits from 1936, which is still in force.

Historical background[edit]

The Straits Convention was an agreement between the major powers to strengthen the Ottoman Empire.^[3] It evolved from the earlier Treaty of the Dardanelles, signed between Britain and the Ottomans in 1809.

Beginning in 1831, Egypt, under the leadership of Muhammad Ali of Egypt, was revolting against the Ottoman Empire, resulting in the Egyptian–Ottoman War (1831–33). Russian Tsar, Nicholas I, chose to support the Ottomans. In 1833, Russia sent a naval force and troops to support the Ottoman defence of Constantinople. Britain was likewise supporting the Ottoman Empire.^[3]

Nevertheless, Russia was then the Ottomans’ principal ally; the two countries signed the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, which reflected this alliance. The Treaty guaranteed that the Ottomans would close the Straits to foreign warships if and when Russia was under threat, and requested this.^[3]

Negotiations[edit]

Still, the hostility between the Turks and the Egyptians continued in 1839, resulting in the Egyptian–Ottoman War (1839–41). The Egyptians again threatened the Ottoman positions. Lord Palmerston of Britain called for talks with Russia, Austria, and Prussia in London in 1840.^[3] This resulted in the Convention of London (1840).

Efforts were made to convince France, which tended to side with Mehmet, to accept a multilateral agreement. This evolved into the Straits Convention of 1841, which included guarantees similar to those of the 1809 Treaty of the Dardanelles, also extending the 1840 Convention of London.

The motivation of Tsar Nicholas I to agree to the closing of the straits has been said to be his uneasiness over the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi,^{[citation needed]} which he feared might turn the other Great Powers against Russia by creating too close an alliance between him and the Sultan, Abdülmecid I.^{[citation needed]} He also authorised the British Navy to quell the attack on the Ottoman Empire by its former vassal, Muhammad Ali. However, Anglo-Russian tensions over the region remained, leading eventually to the Crimean War.

Outcomes[edit]

From the British point of view, this convention helped preserve the European balance of power by preventing Russia’s newly powerful navy from dominating the Mediterranean^{[citation needed]}. From the Russian point of view, the treaty encouraged the aggressive policies of Britain in the region, which would lead to the Crimean War.^{[citation needed]} Different interpretations, as well as history of British-Russian relations in the 1840s, suggest that the Straits Convention ‘appeared to establish a new era of harmony’ between both powers, keeping Russian navy out of the Mediterranean and British out of the Black Sea.^[4]

While these arrangements forced Tsar Nicholas I to abandon his plans for reducing the Ottoman Empire to complete dependence upon Russia and wresting the control of the Christian countries of the Balkans from the Porte, the Ottoman Empire was not wholly independent after the convention, as it relied on Britain and France for protection.^{[citation needed]}

See also[edit]

• International waterway

References[edit]

ЛО́НДОНСКИЕ КОНВЕ́НЦИИ О ПРО­ЛИ́ВАХ 1840, 1841, 1871, со­гла­ше­ния ме­ж­ду Ос­ман­ской им­пе­ри­ей, Рос. им­пе­ри­ей и ев­роп. дер­жа­ва­ми о ста­ту­се Чер­но­морских про­ли­вов (Бос­фор и Дар­да­нел­лы), за­клю­чён­ные в рам­ках уре­гу­ли­ро­ва­ния Вос­точ­но­го во­про­са. Под­пи­са­ны в Лон­до­не.

Лон­дон­ская кон­вен­ция 3(15). 7.1840 за­клю­че­на ме­ж­ду Ос­ман­ской им­пе­ри­ей, Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ни­ей, Рос­си­ей, Ав­ст­ри­ей и Прус­си­ей по­сле об­ра­ще­ния тур. сто­ро­ны за по­мо­щью к Рос­сии, Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нии и Фран­ции в борь­бе про­тив мя­те­жа егип. па­ши Му­хам­ме­да Али (см. в ст. Еги­пет­ско-ту­рец­кие кон­флик­ты 1831–33 и 1839–41). Фран­ция, в этот пе­ри­од под­дер­жи­вав­шая Му­хам­ме­да Али, от­ка­за­лась при­сое­ди­нить­ся к кон­вен­ции, но не пред­при­ня­ла ре­ши­тель­ных дей­ствий в за­щи­ту егип. па­ши. Кон­вен­ция 1840 оп­ре­де­ля­ла ус­ло­вия пре­кра­ще­ния во­ен. дей­ст­вий ме­ж­ду Егип­том и центр. тур. вла­стя­ми и ме­ры «к при­ве­де­нию сих ус­ло­вий в ис­пол­не­ние». Ус­ло­вия из­ла­га­лись в от­дель­ном ак­те, пре­ду­смат­ри­вав­шем, что в об­мен на пре­кра­ще­ние во­ен. дей­ст­вий Му­хам­ме­дом Али и при­зна­ние им вер­хов­ной вла­сти ос­ман­ско­го пра­ви­тель­ст­ва сул­тан Аб­дул-Мед­жид I го­тов пе­ре­дать Му­хам­ме­ду Али Еги­пет в по­том­ст­вен­ное, а юж. часть Си­рии – в по­жиз­нен­ное управ­ле­ние. Соб­ст­вен­но кон­вен­ция пре­ду­смат­ри­ва­ла, что фло­ты Ав­ст­рии и Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нии не­за­мед­ли­тель­но пре­се­кут пе­ре­бро­ску егип. войск в Си­рию, а по прось­бе Тур­ции все 4 дер­жа­вы мо­гут на­пра­вить воо­руж. си­лы для за­щи­ты про­ли­вов и Стам­бу­ла (Кон­стан­ти­но­по­ля) от на­па­де­ния егип. войск. Под­твер­жда­лось «древ­нее пра­ви­ло» Ос­ман­ской им­пе­рии, со­глас­но ко­то­ро­му, по­ка она не на­хо­дит­ся в со­стоя­нии вой­ны, в Чер­но­мор­ские про­ли­вы не до­пус­ка­ют­ся иностр. во­ен. ко­раб­ли (кро­ме лёг­ких во­ен. ко­раб­лей, об­слу­жи­вав­ших ди­пло­ма­тические мис­сии дру­же­ст­вен­ных дер­жав). По­сле то­го как Му­хам­мед Али от­верг уль­ти­ма­тум ев­ропейских дер­жав, 10.9.1840 Ав­ст­рия и Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ния на­ча­ли во­ен. дей­ст­вия про­тив Егип­та, не­ко­то­рые пле­ме­на в Си­рии и Ли­ва­не вос­ста­ли про­тив егип. ок­ку­па­ци­он­ных войск, и вско­ре Му­хам­мед Али ка­пи­ту­ли­ро­вал.

В Лон­дон­ской кон­вен­ции 1(13).7.1841 (дей­ст­во­ва­ла до 1871) стра­ны, под­пи­сав­шие Л. к. 1840, а так­же Фран­ция (её но­вое пра­ви­тель­ст­во, где наи­боль­шим влия­ни­ем поль­зо­вал­ся Ф. Ги­зо, ис­кав­ший сою­за с К. Мет­тер­ни­хом, от­ка­за­ло Егип­ту в под­держ­ке) под­твер­ди­ли по­ло­же­ния Л. к. 1840 о ре­жи­ме Чер­но­мор­ских про­ли­вов. Кон­вен­ции 1840 и 1841 ли­к­ви­ди­ро­ва­ли пре­иму­ще­ст­во Рос­сии, по­лу­чен­ное ею со­глас­но Ун­кяр-Ис­ке­ле­сий­ско­му до­го­во­ру 1833 (обя­зы­вал Тур­цию в слу­чае вой­ны по тре­бо­ва­нию Рос­сии за­кры­вать прол. Дар­да­нел­лы для во­ен. ко­раб­лей всех стран). В пе­ри­од Крым­ской вой­ны 1853–56 нор­ма о за­кры­тии про­ли­вов не дей­ст­во­ва­ла, по­сколь­ку Тур­ция объ­я­ви­ла вой­ну Рос­сии и ко­раб­ли Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­нии и Фран­ции бес­пре­пят­ст­вен­но про­хо­ди­ли в Чёр­ное мо­ре.

Лон­дон­ская кон­вен­ция 1(13).3.1871 за­клю­че­на ме­ж­ду Ос­ман­ской им­пе­ри­ей, Ве­ли­ко­бри­та­ни­ей, Рос­си­ей, Прус­си­ей, Ав­ст­ро-Венг­ри­ей, Фран­ци­ей и Ита­ли­ей в свя­зи с от­ка­зом Рос­сии в 1870 от по­ло­же­ний Па­риж­ско­го ми­ра 1856, за­пре­щав­ших ей иметь во­ен. флот на Чёр­ном мо­ре. Кон­вен­ция за­кре­п­ля­ла од­но­сто­рон­нее ре­ше­ние Рос­сии; ус­та­нав­ли­ва­ла, что Чер­но­мор­ские про­ли­вы долж­ны ос­та­вать­ся за­кры­ты­ми для во­ен. ко­раб­лей, но пре­дос­тав­ля­ла Тур­ции пра­во от­кры­вать их в мир­ное вре­мя для ко­раб­лей «дру­же­ст­вен­ных и со­юз­ных дер­жав» во ис­пол­не­ние ста­тей Па­риж­ско­го ми­ра 1856, ко­то­рые со­хра­ня­ли свою си­лу; под­твер­жда­лось пра­во про­хо­да в Чёр­ное м. тор­го­вых ко­раб­лей всех стран и пра­во Ос­ман­ской им­пе­рии по­сы­лать свои во­ен. ко­раб­ли в р. Ду­най. Кон­вен­ция по­зво­ли­ла Рос­сии уси­лить свой ВМФ на Чёр­ном м. в пред­две­рии рус.-тур. вой­ны 1877–78, но ос­тав­ля­ла ре­жим поль­зо­ва­ния Чер­но­мор­ски­ми про­ли­ва­ми прак­ти­че­ски преж­ним, по­сколь­ку окон­чат. ре­ше­ние по по­во­ду про­хо­да во­ен. ко­раб­лей ос­та­ва­лось за Тур­ци­ей. Кон­вен­ция бы­ла под­твер­жде­на 63-й стать­ёй Бер­лин­ско­го трак­та­та 1878, и пре­ду­смот­рен­ный ею ре­жим про­ли­вов про­дол­жал дей­ст­во­вать до 1-й ми­ро­вой вой­ны.